Introduction
Scholarly insistence on the need for congruence
between the form of government institutions, on the one hand, and political
culture, on the other, can easily be traced in an unending stream back at least
to Aristotle. However, among modern democratic theorists, the concept of political support and its component
elements is most commonly discussed with reference to the work of David Easton (Klingermann,
Hans-Dieter; 1998, Pp 98-202). But the concept of support is very complex, and
scholars throughout history have sought to analyze this complexity for better
comprehension.
In this respect, Easton makes a clear distinction between the
object of support and the types of support. According to him, the objects of
support can be demarcated into support for the political community, the regime,
and the incumbent authorities. With regards to the types of support, Easton discriminated
between two kinds of support: specific and diffuse. For the purpose of
this paper, I am going to focus on specific political support, particularly on
political authorities at the level of chief executives; those individuals who
currently hold positions of political authority, such as prime ministers,
presidents, legislators, or in a broader sense the pool of political elites
from which government leaders are drawn.
My main
focus will be to investigate, how citizens evaluate the present incumbents of
office rather than the office itself. Evaluation of political authorities is an
important element of the political process (Russell J. Dalton 2004; Pp.6). Dalton posits that in a
well-functioning political system, the citizens support the incumbents of
government who make authoritative political decisions, as well as endorsing the
general principles of the political system.
Conceptualization
of specific support
The specificity of political support therefore
lies on the distinction between affects for the incumbent and affects for the
system. Muller (1977) argues that the hypothesis behind the distinction between
incumbent affect and system affect is that the latter is more consequential for
the stability of a political regime than the former. However, serious doubts
about the applicability of the incumbent-system distinction to the real world
has arisen which center around the question of whether it is possible to
measure something like “effectiveness” or approval of the performance of an
incumbent administration, as opposed to something like “legitimacy” or support
for the system of government in general (Edward Muller and Thomas Jukam; 1977,
pp. 1561-1595). Other scholars in the domain of politics such as Gerhard
Loewenberg, have found a strong correlation between incumbent-system affect,
hence attempting to isolate Easton ’s
distinction between specific and diffuse support. Muller, agreeing with
Leowenberg insists that if it turns out that incumbent-system distinction is
impossible to validate empirically, then it has no utility as part of any
explanation of the stability or instability of a political regime. He therefore
tried to add “aggressive political behavior” as a conditional variable to
modify Easton ’s
discrimination between specific and diffuse support. However, despite his
plausible arguments, I still believe that Easton ’s
axiomatic differentiation between specific and diffuse support stand on
unshakable academic grounds.
I therefore agree with Easton that “without
discriminating in some way between specific and diffuse support, we could not
explain adequately the occurrence of extreme political tension, conflict and
discontent in some systems, especially democratic ones, without all these
giving rise to serious threats to the stability of the regime or political
community” In this respect, and without underestimating other scholarly
arguments and criticisms, I consider Easton’s conceptualization of specific
support the most appropriate to use in designing a questionnaire for survey
research.
According to Easton , the uniqueness of specific support
lie in its relationship to the satisfactions that members of a system feels
they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political
authorities. Specific support is a response to the authorities; it is only
indirectly relevant, if at all, to the input of support for the regime or
political community. I argue that, acknowledging the indirect relevance of
specific support for the regime or community should not in any case sound like
a contradiction to his very claim of demarcating between specific and diffuse support.
Since the incumbent operates under a government
of a nation or community, specific support for the incumbent whether at the
negative or positive direction will have some indirect repercussions on the
regime or community which he governs. And this does not in any way captures a
diffuse proportion of support. Easton himself
clarifies this potential doubt in a latter article Easton (1976) with some thoughtful questions:
“To what extent are
people able to discriminate between what they view as the evils of a particular
administration and the regime within the context of which this leadership
functions? Even if members of a system are able to distinguish between the
incumbent authorities and the regime, at what point does distrust of a
particular administration begin to erode confidence in all authorities and
finally in the regime itself”?
Talking about evaluation, Douglas Hibbs (1982)
argues that people are assume to evaluate an administration’s performance
relatively than absolutely. Douglas is right
if this assumption is based on comparative evaluation of performance. For
instance when evaluating the cumulative performance of two incumbent presidents
in two different countries. However, since I are evaluating a single incumbent,
I believe that absolute evaluation is more suitable, that is why my request for
answer focuses on absolute rather than comparative judgment.
Working
definition and the scope of analysis
Having situated ourselves in the context of
specific support, I therefore propose to adopt as my working definition that
proposed by Easton ;
namely that specific political support is based on close evaluation of what
political authorities do and how they do it. Specific support is directed
towards the political authorities and authoritative institutions. It assumes
that members have sufficient political awareness to be able to associate
satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the perceived behavior of these
authorities, whether the behavior is in the form of identifiable actions or
some attributed general performance (David Easton; 1975. Pp. 439).
This performance can be further singularized
into three types, namely; instrumental, expressive and extraneous. Instrumental
performance is based on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction by members from
efforts to meet their policy preference. Expressive performance is when members
offer or withhold their support because of symbolic behavior through which the
authorities are “reassuring to the members in a political context”. In this
respect, authorities are being favored because they are viewed as generally
qualified persons. Finally, even when members have little knowledge of the
authorities, the latter may be perceived simply as being likeable- extraneous
performance (David Easton; 1975. Pp. 442).
My subsequent analysis will try to seek a few
explanatory variables to uphold each of the above mentioned types of specific
supports. I believe that instrumental support deals with
satisfaction/dissatisfaction, and evaluation, the former being policy outcome
while the latter being policy effort. Expressive may deal with competence
because it assesses the general qualification of the incumbent. Finally,
extraneous performance which deals with likeability is a category based on
support due to the authority’s charismatic appeal.
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