Reassessing nationalism and patriotism in the context of the Southern Cameroons question in a united Cameroon

 

Reassessing nationalism and patriotism in the context of the Southern Cameroons question in a united Cameroon

By Innocent Mancho

MA Public Health; PgDip Nursing, PgCert Community Development; BA (hons) History, Forensic Psych Nurse and community development practitioner, Clinical Liaison Mental Health

Introduction

Since November 2016, Cameroon has found itself—not unexpectedly— in the middle of a political crisis. Some academics, political commentators, journalists, and politicians have preferred to call this the Anglophone Crisis. In my opinion this is wrong. It started as a strike action called for by Anglophone lawyers and teachers to force government to address sectoral labour grievances and limited to the Anglophone regions. Today, however, it has metamorphosed into proportions that make it more of a Cameroonian than exclusively Anglophone Crisis.

Even if its immediate geographic theatre is the Anglophone regions, the present situation poses an existential crisis for Cameroon as a whole. It has revealed fundamental cracks going through to the foundations of the nation itself. By sticking to the label “Anglophone crisis”, public and private commentators— those who sympathise with the regime— are seeking to downplay the magnitude of the crisis by confining it’s geographic and, arguably, psychological space. The objective here being to deflect and delay, if possible social and political insurgence in other regions. This narrative feeds into the social construction of the Anglophones as the “other” within political discourse and therefore a group of people to be feared; to limit sympathy and encourage apathy from the majority French speaking population of the country. Far from being an “Anglophone crisis”, the current situation is a Cameroonian or national crisis that touches on the legality and legitimacy of the state; national unity and integration and, above all, the State’s authority over 20% of the national territory. The crisis has also exposed fundamental questions about the understanding and application of the concepts of nationalism, citizenship and belonging, identity, community cohesion and cohabitation in the Cameroonian context.  These concepts, if poorly articulated (as has often been the case) profoundly impact social cohesion, peace, and security.

From Rio dos Cameroes to the Cameroon republic

In various social forums, especially among much francophone online community, there seem to be a misconception about the constitution and composition of the present Cameroon nation state. By design or deceit, many tend to believe that a single Cameroonian nation pre-dated German colonisation in 1884. This belief contravenes all historical evidence. Before the establishment of the German colony or protectorate the territory geographically defined thereafter as Kamerun, was a mosaic of ethnic groups governed as kingdoms or chiefdoms. These kingdoms and chiefdoms were either completely independent of each other or confederated. 

Rio dos Cameroes, as named by the Portuguese was a reference to the estuaries and the areas surrounding the River Wouri. German Kamerun extended beyond the frontiers of present-day Cameroon and included northern parts of Gabon and the Congo with western parts of the Central African Republic, southwestern parts of Chad and far eastern parts of Nigeria. One consequence of Germany’s defeat by allied forces during World War one (WW1) saw the re-balkanization of German protectorates particularly between France and Britain. As a result, parts of German Kamerun were merged with neighbouring French colonies of Gabon, Central Africa and to an extent British Nigeria. The remaining chunk of the territory of German Kamerun was subsequently divided into two parts: the French Cameroons and the British Cameroons. The British Cameroons was further divided into British Southern Cameroon and British Northern Cameroons. In UN supervised plebiscites organized on February 11, 1961 as part of the decolonization process of British Cameroons, British Northern Cameroons opted to achieve independence by joining Nigeria while British Southern Cameroons voted to achieve independence by joining French Cameroon. A number of preliminary conclusions arise from this.

The first is that present day Cameroon is only a fraction of what existed topographically as German Kamerun. Second, present day Cameroon did not exist before October 1, 1961. This is the date when the decision—independence and reunification— taken by British Southern Cameroon eight months earlier in the plebiscite took legal effect with Britain’s final withdrawal. Third, and odd as it may sound, British Southern Cameroon was technically and legally an independent territory at the same moment as it was re-joining French Cameroon, which had gained its independence from France earlier on January 1, 1960. At its founding therefore on October 1, 1961, present day Cameroon was not one but two distinct territories which through the popular will of the people of the former British Southern Cameroons and the political will of the leaders of the French Cameroons came together to form a new state, the federal republic of Cameroon. The 1961 Federal Republic was not German Kamerun. It was not the same territory conquered by Allied forces in 1914/15. It was not all of the mandated territories of the League of Nations, and it was not all of the trust territories of the United Nation entrusted to Britain and France.

Patriotism and nationalism, citizenship and belonging in the present

While it is possible to discuss the current crisis as a separate and distinct episode in Cameroon’s social and political history, it is however impossible to analyse how the application of the concept of nationalism, patriotism and citizenship and belonging have evolved in Cameroon without referring to the very foundations of the Cameroon nation and the concept of “Cameronnism”. The current crisis calls to question what it means to be Cameroonian. “Cameroonism” refers to the ideology of being Cameroonian: the acquisition and the development of values that are peculiar and uniquely Cameroonian and the codification of a Cameroonian identity that provides the framework for assessing Cameroonian patriotism, nationalism and the Cameroonian way of life.

As the debate rages on the status of the Southern Cameroons within the present nation state, legitimate questions have emerged about the concepts of patriotism and nationalism as understood by citizens on both sides of the political debate.  On the one hand the “legalists”, predominantly pro government and French speaking Cameroonians have described patriotism and nationalism as undisputed loyalty to “les institutions républicaines”, a total acceptance of government and an unquestioning compliance with the status quo. They see reformist, whether progressives or “transformist” as unpatriotic and “unnationalistic”. They portray the president as incarnating the nation therefore being the nation such that anyone who questions the status quo or shows a dislike for the president, in their view, equally translates into a dislike for the nation. The president wields the power of the nation. Government and republican institutions wield the power of the president. Failure to respect these institutions and government is therefore non-respect for the president and therefore unpatriotic and unnationalistic. Where institutions or agents acting on behalf of the president and therefore the state make laws and decisions that are unjust, illegal or morally repugnant in the application of “le devoir régalien du chef de d’état” non-compliance with these laws and regulations are seen as unpatriotic and unnationalistic. The argument is that the rule of law must be respected, and redress must be sought within the rule of law even when that law is unjust or illegally applied, deliberately misinterpreted; selectively implemented and dynamically versatile to be moulded to suit situations and circumstances depending on affiliations and affinities. Respecting the rule of law is therefore an obligation that holds true only as one moves progressively away from the centre of power. Put otherwise, respect for the rule of law is a one-sided obligation, particularly on citizens who challenge the status quo. Further, the fluidity of actors dilutes the consistency of law especially as applied in the peripheries.

The relationship between the “legalitarian” interpretation of patriotism and nationalism as applied by pro-government and majority French speaking Cameroonians is evident in the condescending and sometimes dismissive reactions to progressives and “transformists. From the 1950s and well into the 1970s, UPC activists were referred to as “les Marquis” or terrorists in modern parlance. Portrayed as enemies of the nation, Um Nyobe; Ernest Ouandie and the UPC leadership were decapitated (literally and figuratively) or forced into exile. The war against the enemies of the state, unpatriotic and unnationalistic UPC supporters resulted in the genocide of the Bassas and Bamilikes in a war that has never been acknowledged. History, however, has revealed that those who paraded the corridors of power and presented themselves as real patriots and nationalist were indeed “house slaves” and colonial collaborators. The role reversal has seen the traitors of yesterday exonerated and adored as the real nationalists and patriots.

In the 1990s when a group of Anglophones questioned the relevance of the one party system and challenged the hegemony of the ruling party, they were referred to as “les ennemis dans la maison”.  Far reaching elements went further to refer to Anglophone Cameroonians as “les Biafriens” in reference to Ojuku’s breakaway republic in Nigeria; indirectly questioning both their rights to citizenship and their patriotism.

The educational system of a country forms an integral part of its cultural heritage. It is the vehicle that links its past to its present and shapes the path for its future. The Anglophone subsystem of education and its GCE for generations has been the pride of the peoples of the Southern Cameroons; the GCE itself became an institution, a symbol of pride, of identity, valued and cherished by parents, students, and teachers alike. The experiences of Anglophone students in the technical schools based on an adaption of the francophone system with the CAP, Probatoire and BAC tainted the perception that Anglophones had of the French system.  Not only were students taught in a strange form of English, but examination questions also sometimes loosely translate from French made no sense. Performance rates in these exams were almost always appalling.

At the start of this current crisis, Hubert Mono Djana, a francophone professor described Anglophone teachers and parents resisting the educational harmonisation plans proposed by the ministers of higher and secondary education as unpatriotic. The Anglophone subsystem of education forms a core of the bilingual and bicultural nature of the Cameroon state as founded in 1961. Touting the harmonisation agenda has been a recurrent theme by successive governments and rings the bells of a political agenda designed to transform the bicultural nature of the country into a replica French Cameroun state. The Teachers Association of Cameroon (TAC) and student protests of 1993, which led to the university uprisings and subsequent educational reforms (the creation of the GCE board and the University of Buea) were the direct consequences of attempts by Robert Mbella Mbappe then minister of national education to introduce the CAP, Probatoire and BAC in the English educational system. It was perceived by many then as an attempt to do away with the GCE and subvert the English sub system of education. It is, unsurprising therefore that there was a global resistance to harmonisation, whatever the merits of it were. Merits which were poorly and condescendingly articulated; based on an ill-thought premise and a bizarre superiority complex that the French system of education is what is best for Cameroon. There appears to be an unrelenting perception that what is good for the goose must by necessity be best for the gander and the gosling. Yet the intricate historical and political evolution of the two Cameroons suggests that this by necessity is not always the case.

There appears to be an institutional and a systemic connivance with the vitriolic rhetoric regarding the patriotism of Southern Cameroonians. The unrestricted granting of media coverage by private and public TV and radio channels to some intellectuals, journalists and opinion leaders, whose xenophobic statements have bordered on declaring Anglophone and southern Cameroon protesters no Cameroonians seem to suggest this. For example, Ernest Obama a journalist on Vision 4 television channel based in Yaoundé called for the eradication and the neutralisation of agitators by the forces of national security. His suggestions were widely perceived as hate speech and a call for genocide. While his diction incited a lot of protests including among Cameroon journalists who complained to the National Communications’ Council (NCC), Obama has remained active in the airwaves (recently becoming a spokesperson/director of communication for Samuel Eto’o Fils and fecafoot president) and was granted the privilege of interviewing the minister of communication and spokesperson for the government. Ernest Obama asked the minister about the complaints made against him by English speaking journalist to the NCC and what the minister as chair of this regulatory outfit will do about it. On the other hand, the minister of communication and chair of the NCC threatened to withdraw the licence/authorisation to broadcast of the television channel if they invited Anglophones to talk about that did not support the position of the state in the definition of national unity.

The virulent language has also resonated within administrative circles. The minister of justice and the minister of state in charge of communications variously described southern Cameroon protesters as terrorists and openly compared them to the armed Islamic group Boko Haram. This comparison has been repeated across various media by academics and journalists including Owona Nguini who described southern Cameroonian activists as “les apprentis sorcier”, “des analphabètes”, “ils sont fous ces autonomists”, “les aventuriers”, “si les illumines de l’ambazonisme tentent la voie armée ils seront massacre”. Thus, it is not just the nationalism and patriotism of the Anglophones that is questioned by some French speaking academics and public figures but their intelligence and intellectual capacity to make judgement and independent reasoning. This lends credence to the argument, which has also been echoed by some Anglophones, that Southern Cameroons Protesters   are manipulated by the diasporas, who hidden in the comfort of their western societies feel safe behind their computer screens to incite others to protest and die on the streets.

Southern Cameroonians as less than citizens

Objectification and dehumanisation for decades have been employed as weapons in the pursuance of power and domination.  Europeans justified slavery and slave ownership by describing Africans as less than humans and developing race theory to justify their perceived superiority. Objectification as a precursor to exploitation, violence and abuse is further visible particularly in studies relating to gender-based violence and the role of women in pornography. In studies of patriarchy, women are often described as objects to be owned by men and disposed of as the owners see fit.  In the current context of southern Cameroons nationalism and politics, some Francophone academics have tended to objectify southern Cameroons rather than describe them as citizens. To acknowledge them as citizens and as a people would have given credence and legitimacy to their grievances. 

Thus, the recurrent theme of the southern Cameroonian being the enemy within necessitating the need for elimination, taming and controlling; two cubes of sugar that need to be absorbed thereby wiping out its uniqueness and identity; dogs that pose a threat to public peace and security needing to be put down.

The de-industrialisation of the southern Cameroons from 1961 illustrates the paternalistic and ownership approach in which francophone led government in Yaoundé disposed of southern Cameroons productive industries. Thus, co-operations like the marketing board, Power Cam; banks, cooperatives, service sectors, public works department etc. were either shipped out of the region or facilitated to collapse. The treatment meted on protesters— particularly university students in Buea in October and November of 2016, the number of people killed between 22 September and 1 October 2017 and the mass incarcerations—demonstrates the less than human value attributed the citizens of the southern Cameroons by institutions and representatives of the state. The degrading treatment of having people bath and swim in sewage water and mud has been a continuing act of imposing the worse forms of humiliation. Humiliation is used to assert power through the denial and the destruction of status. Hence the arrest and incarceration of a sitting Supreme Court justice, a university professor, an international human rights lawyer and a popular radio talk show host. It is employed as a form of punishment, abuse and oppression, with the hope that the dread of humiliation will serve as a deterrent against political agitations, protests and uprising.

The very nature of humiliation is to undermine the victims resolve and ability against the aggressor. It targets the victim’s self-worth and self- esteem, inflicting significant emotional and psychological damage to eliminate the possibility of a fight back. The real cost of humiliation is the psychological and emotional damage it creates leaving behind a trail of post-traumatic stress. The purpose of the rampant degrading behaviour of the military and armed forces against the population is thus to impose a regime of fear, of anxiety and of permanent psychological damage that will prevent a resurgence of agitations and protests. Ultimately humiliation can be counterproductive when it bounces off on a wall of resilience and grit, especially when this has been ignored and underestimated.

Conclusion

There is no correlation between political party affiliation and nationalism. The Scottish National Party lost a referendum on Scottish independence yet won a majority in the UK general elections that followed. This supports the thesis that though the Scots are patriotic about Scotland their love for a Scottish identity does not negate their love for a united Great Britain. Rather than perceive Southern Cameroons nationalism as a threat and unpatriotic manoeuvre, it should be embraced and celebrated, protected, and recognised as being an integral to the nation building journey.

The Scottish nationalist party won an outright majority in the general elections in 2011 yet lost out on a Scottish independence referendum. Their love of the Scottish nation and the preservation of the Scottish culture and identity does not diminish their love and patriotism for a United Kingdom of Great Britain.

To argue that Cameroon is one or that Cameroon has always been one and indivisible is a deliberate misrepresentation of historical facts to drive a political agenda. The desire to maintain the unity of the Cameroon nation state should not be at the detriment of historical truth. Genuine nationalism should not be built on falsehood, deceit, and coercion. The construction of a stable nation must emanate from the desires and aspirations of “home nations” to forge a single, united yet diversified national identity built on the mutual respect of individuality. The fight for social justice, for the rule of law, for better governance, for transparency and for accountable must not be perceived as being at variance with nationalism. Rather corruption; greed; usurpation of political office, political gerrymandering, cronyism; nepotism must be seen as unpatriotic and anathema to nation building. To label those fighting for truth, social justice, for good governance and for effective democratic processes and representation as unpatriotic should be seen as acts of treason.

Field Marshall and the changing dynamics of the Ambazonia war of independence

Field Marshall and the changing revolutionary dynamics
The coronation of Field Marshall, Commander of the Red Dragons of Lebialem as a traditional ruler highlights a significant shift in the dynamics of the Ambazonia War of independence. 
During the colonial era, traditionally rulers provided the channel throughout authority was exercised on the people. Traditional rulers in the southern Cameroons constituted a significant authority and were represented in governance and legislature in what was known as the house of chiefs. In the post-referendum era and the periods under LRC occupation, traditional rulers were classified by a decree from Yaoundé creating first, second and third class chiefs with decreasing influence and authority. They were referred to as auxiliaries of the administration. There was also the introduction of a state allowance, which enabled traditional rulers to have money from the government of Yaoundé but also to be influenced and manipulated. 
As the power and authority of the chiefs weakened and was usurped by appointees from Yaoundé, the occupational authority proceeded to appoint new chiefs by decree by carving out villages as favours to political cronies.
Traditional folklore and the history of most Ambazonian kingdoms (as with most African kingdoms) trace their origins to a warrior king/fon/chief that conquered lands or defeat others in order to wars to establish their kingdom. The coronation of Field Marshall in Lebialem therefore, is not a departure from history. Rather it is a continuation of history, only at a time when kingship by war and blood is no longer en vogue. What however, makes his coronation all the more revolutionary is the fact that it happened at a time when existing chiefs and fons of the region had abdicated and negated their duties for personal economic expediencies. They created a customary, traditional and leadership vacuum that needed to filled by someone with the inner strength and fortitude to rally the people, some who offered the people hope and something to believe in. what his detractors have failed to appreciate is the social and economic decadence that the people of that region live in. they also fail to appreciate the psychological impact that this decadence has on the people, the emotional and mental toll, the hopelessness. 
At the start of this conflict there were videos of many villages marching to the palaces of their fons and chiefs, whom they saw as their representatives and also people they thought the government would listen to, to submit petitions asking these chiefs to speak on their behalf to the government. What has transpired though has been the co-option and corruption of these chiefs, their politicization of the traditional institutions they were entrusted to hold for and on behalf their behalf. They have been co-opted into the central and political bureau of the oppressors machinery; appointed senators, ministers, technical advisers etc. Their voices are no longer those of their people as they a cowered by their fear of losing privileges. They have betrayed their people. 
The coronation of Field Marshall therefore makes a significant shift in the dynamics of the Ambazonian war of independence. It does so a two simple ways. The first is that it takes out the most advanced and entrenched outer post of the central colonial administrative systems. As started earlier traditional rulers are considered auxiliaries of the Yaoundé administrative system. By repudiating existing chieftains in Lebialem, Field Marshall has severed the umbilical cord that links the villages and people under his military command area to the Yaoundé government.
Secondly, Field Marshall is sending a strong signal to all chiefs and fons who have decided to side with Yaoundé against the aspirations of their people that their time is up. In a recent interview the Fon of Mankon stated that he was an architect of reunification and would labour to protect the one and indivisibility of Cameroon. He out rightly ignored the call of his subjects who have unreservedly declared their allegiance to Ambazonia and renounced the occupation of their homeland by LRC. He is also talking to those Ambazonian chiefs and fons who have been co-opted into LRC senate and parliament to enable and legitimise the genocide of their people that as they side with the oppressor they are abdicating and negating their custodial duties to protect their people. Any chief who abandons his people at time of war loses their legitimacy and they right to be their chief or fon. 
Field Marshall has changed the dynamics of the Ambazonian war of independence in the battle front in and the reconstruction of the administrative set at the local level. He is doing away with the old system of entitled and hereditary chiefs. He has revived the old days when chiefs earned their stripes in battle, where respect, power and authority are earned and not inherited by virtue of being born into it.  
The message also is for the commanders in the Northern Zone, especially those in Bali, Mankon and Bafut. He’s telling you that the time is now to tell your chiefs, especially those who are senators and members of parliament that the time is now for them to stand with their people. If they are not able to stand with and for their people they will be replaced by someone with the grid and fortitude to incarnate and do justice to the aspirations of the Ambazonian people. 
Innocent Mancho 

The conceptualization of political support

By Christian Atabong

Introduction

Scholarly insistence on the need for congruence between the form of government institutions, on the one hand, and political culture, on the other, can easily be traced in an unending stream back at least to Aristotle. However, among modern democratic theorists, the concept of political support and its component elements is most commonly discussed with reference to the work of David Easton (Klingermann, Hans-Dieter; 1998, Pp 98-202). But the concept of support is very complex, and scholars throughout history have sought to analyze this complexity for better comprehension.

In this respect, Easton makes a clear distinction between the object of support and the types of support. According to him, the objects of support can be demarcated into support for the political community, the regime, and the incumbent authorities. With regards to the types of support, Easton discriminated between two kinds of support:  specific and diffuse. For the purpose of this paper, I am going to focus on specific political support, particularly on political authorities at the level of chief executives; those individuals who currently hold positions of political authority, such as prime ministers, presidents, legislators, or in a broader sense the pool of political elites from which government leaders are drawn.

My main focus will be to investigate, how citizens evaluate the present incumbents of office rather than the office itself. Evaluation of political authorities is an important element of the political process (Russell J. Dalton 2004; Pp.6). Dalton posits that in a well-functioning political system, the citizens support the incumbents of government who make authoritative political decisions, as well as endorsing the general principles of the political system.

Conceptualization of specific support

The specificity of political support therefore lies on the distinction between affects for the incumbent and affects for the system. Muller (1977) argues that the hypothesis behind the distinction between incumbent affect and system affect is that the latter is more consequential for the stability of a political regime than the former. However, serious doubts about the applicability of the incumbent-system distinction to the real world has arisen which center around the question of whether it is possible to measure something like “effectiveness” or approval of the performance of an incumbent administration, as opposed to something like “legitimacy” or support for the system of government in general (Edward Muller and Thomas Jukam; 1977, pp. 1561-1595). Other scholars in the domain of politics such as Gerhard Loewenberg, have found a strong correlation between incumbent-system affect, hence attempting to isolate Easton’s distinction between specific and diffuse support. Muller, agreeing with Leowenberg insists that if it turns out that incumbent-system distinction is impossible to validate empirically, then it has no utility as part of any explanation of the stability or instability of a political regime. He therefore tried to add “aggressive political behavior” as a conditional variable to modify Easton’s discrimination between specific and diffuse support. However, despite his plausible arguments, I still believe that Easton’s axiomatic differentiation between specific and diffuse support stand on unshakable academic grounds.

I therefore agree with Easton that “without discriminating in some way between specific and diffuse support, we could not explain adequately the occurrence of extreme political tension, conflict and discontent in some systems, especially democratic ones, without all these giving rise to serious threats to the stability of the regime or political community” In this respect, and without underestimating other scholarly arguments and criticisms, I consider Easton’s conceptualization of specific support the most appropriate to use in designing a questionnaire for survey research.

According to Easton, the uniqueness of specific support lie in its relationship to the satisfactions that members of a system feels they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities. Specific support is a response to the authorities; it is only indirectly relevant, if at all, to the input of support for the regime or political community. I argue that, acknowledging the indirect relevance of specific support for the regime or community should not in any case sound like a contradiction to his very claim of demarcating between specific and diffuse support.

Since the incumbent operates under a government of a nation or community, specific support for the incumbent whether at the negative or positive direction will have some indirect repercussions on the regime or community which he governs. And this does not in any way captures a diffuse proportion of support. Easton himself clarifies this potential doubt in a latter article Easton (1976) with some thoughtful questions:

“To what extent are people able to discriminate between what they view as the evils of a particular administration and the regime within the context of which this leadership functions? Even if members of a system are able to distinguish between the incumbent authorities and the regime, at what point does distrust of a particular administration begin to erode confidence in all authorities and finally in the regime itself”?

Easton’s response to these questions not only clarifies our understanding of specific support but also helps draw a line (however tiny it maybe) between the two dimensions of support that he propounded. He believes that there has been a kind of sequence of events, all within the span of living memory, in which subsequent new major causes for distrust of existing authorities could lead both elites and members to search for some alternative, more acceptable, regime, possibly on the left, more probably on the right. The specific support that is characteristically generated or diminished through political outputs would thereby have overflowed to erode the diffuse support that had attached members to the present regime. Specific support according to Easton is object-specific. It is directed to the perceived decisions, policies, actions utterances or the general style of the authorities. People may seek in a rough way to match perceived outputs to their articulated demands. The authorities will be evaluated according to the extent to which these demands are perceived to have been met. Evaluation of the authorities may be of a positive or negative dimension and may therefore turn on the assessment of the perceived general performance of the authorities (David Easton; 1975. Pp. 435-457).

Talking about evaluation, Douglas Hibbs (1982) argues that people are assume to evaluate an administration’s performance relatively than absolutely. Douglas is right if this assumption is based on comparative evaluation of performance. For instance when evaluating the cumulative performance of two incumbent presidents in two different countries. However, since I are evaluating a single incumbent, I believe that absolute evaluation is more suitable, that is why my request for answer focuses on absolute rather than comparative judgment.

Working definition and the scope of analysis

Having situated ourselves in the context of specific support, I therefore propose to adopt as my working definition that proposed by Easton; namely that specific political support is based on close evaluation of what political authorities do and how they do it. Specific support is directed towards the political authorities and authoritative institutions. It assumes that members have sufficient political awareness to be able to associate satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the perceived behavior of these authorities, whether the behavior is in the form of identifiable actions or some attributed general performance (David Easton; 1975. Pp. 439).

This performance can be further singularized into three types, namely; instrumental, expressive and extraneous. Instrumental performance is based on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction by members from efforts to meet their policy preference. Expressive performance is when members offer or withhold their support because of symbolic behavior through which the authorities are “reassuring to the members in a political context”. In this respect, authorities are being favored because they are viewed as generally qualified persons. Finally, even when members have little knowledge of the authorities, the latter may be perceived simply as being likeable- extraneous performance (David Easton; 1975. Pp. 442).

My subsequent analysis will try to seek a few explanatory variables to uphold each of the above mentioned types of specific supports. I believe that instrumental support deals with satisfaction/dissatisfaction, and evaluation, the former being policy outcome while the latter being policy effort. Expressive may deal with competence because it assesses the general qualification of the incumbent. Finally, extraneous performance which deals with likeability is a category based on support due to the authority’s charismatic appeal.

 Note: This is an academic piece. All rights reserved. No part of this article can be copied, photocopied, printed, reprinted or stored in any device, without the prior and expressed permission of the author.

Reassessing Anglophone patriotism and nationalism in the context of the Southern Cameroons question within a united Cameroon

Since November 2016, Cameroon has found itself—not unexpectedly— in the middle of a political crisis. Some academics, political commentators, journalists and politicians have preferred to call this the Anglophone Crisis. In my opinion this is wrong. It started as a strike action called for by Anglophone lawyers and teachers to force government to address sectoral labour grievances, and limited to the Anglophone regions. Today, however, it has metamorphosed into proportions that make it more of a Cameroonian than exclusively Anglophone Crisis.

Even if its immediate geographic theatre is the Anglophone regions, the present situation poses an existential crisis for Cameroon as a whole. It has revealed fundamental cracks going through to the foundations of the nation itself. By sticking to the label “Anglophone crisis”, public and private commentators— in particular those who sympathise with the regime— are seeking to downplay the magnitude of the crisis by confining it’s geographic and, arguably, psychological space. The objective here being to deflect and delay, if possible social and political insurgence in other regions. This narrative feeds into the social construction of the Anglophones as the “other” within political discourse and therefore a group of people to be feared; to limit sympathy and encourage apathy from the majority French speaking population of the country. Far from being an “Anglophone crisis”, the current situation is a Cameroonian or national crisis that touches on the legality and legitimacy of the state; national unity and integration and, above all, the State’s authority over 20% of the national territory. The crisis has also exposed fundamental questions about the understanding and application of the concepts of nationalism, citizenship and belonging, identity, community cohesion and cohabitation in the Cameroonian context.  These concepts, if poorly articulated (as has often been the case) can profoundly impact social cohesion, peace and security.

In various social forums, especially among much francophone online community, there seem to be a misconception about the constitution and composition of the present Cameroon nation state. By design or deceit, many tend to believe that a single Cameroonian nation pre-dated German colonisation in 1884. This belief contravenes all historical evidence. Before the establishment of the German colony or protectorate the territory geographically defined thereafter as Kamerun, was a mosaic of ethnic groups governed as kingdoms or chiefdoms. These kingdoms and chiefdoms were either completely independent of each other or sometimes confederated.

Rio dos Cameroes, as named by the Portuguese was a reference to the estuaries and the areas surrounding the River Wouri. The German Kamerun extended beyond the frontiers of present day Cameroon and included northern parts of Gabon and the Congo with western parts of the Central African Republic, southwestern parts of Chad and far eastern parts of Nigeria. Germany’s defeat during world war one (WW1) by allied forces saw the re-balkanization of German protectorates particularly between France and Britain. As a result, parts of German Kamerun were merged with neighboring French colonies of Gabon, Central Africa and to an extent British Nigeria. What was left of German Kamerun was subsequently divided into two parts: the French Cameroons and the British Cameroons. The British Cameroons was further divided into British Southern Cameroons and British Northern Cameroons. While the British Northern Cameroons opted to join Nigeria British Southern Cameroons voted in a UN sponsored plebiscite on 11^th February 1961 to join French Cameroon. A number of preliminary conclusions arise from this.

The first is that present day Cameroon is only a fraction of what existed topographically as German Kamerun. Second, present day Cameroon did not exist before October 1, 1961. This is the date when the decision—independence and reunification— taken by British Southern Cameroon eight months earlier in the plebiscite took effect with Britain’s final withdrawal. Third, and odd as it may sound, British Southern Cameroon was technically and legally an independent territory at the same moment as it was joining French Cameroon, which had gained its independence  from France earlier on January 1, 1960. At its founding therefore on October 1 1961, present day Cameroon was not one but two distinct territories which through the popular will of the people of the former British Southern Cameroons and the political will of the leaders of the French Cameroons came together to form a new state, the federal republic of Cameroon. The 1961 Federal Republic was not German Kamerun. It was not the same territory conquered by Allied forces in 1914/15. It was not all of the mandated territories of the League of Nations and it was not all of the trust territories of the United Nation entrusted to Britain and France.

While it is possible to discuss the current crisis as a separate and distinct episode in Cameroon’s social and political history, it is however impossible to analyse how the application of the concept of nationalism, patriotism and citizenship and belonging have evolved in Cameroon without referring to the very foundations of the Cameroon nation and the concept of “Cameroonism”. The current crisis calls to question what it means to be Cameroonian. “Cameroonism” refers to the ideology of being Cameroonian, the development of values that a peculiar and uniquely Cameroonian and the codification of a Cameroonian identity that provides the framework for assessing Cameroonian patriotism, nationalism and the Cameroonian way of life.

As the debate rages on about the status of the Southern Cameroons within the present nation state legitimate questions have emerged about the concepts of patriotism and nationalism as understood by citizens on both sides of the political debate.  On the one hand the “legalists”, predominantly pro government Anglophones and some French speaking Cameroonians have described patriotism and nationalism in terms of undisputed loyalty to “les institutions républicaines”, a total acceptance of government and an unquestioning compliance with the status quo. They see reformist, whether progressives or “transformist” as unpatriotic and unnationalistic agitators. They portray the president as incarnating the nation therefore being the nation. A dislike for the president is therefore a dislike for the nation. The president wields the power of the nation. Government and republican institutions wield the power of the president and therefore non-respect of these institutions and government is non-respect for the president and therefore unpatriotic and unnationalistic. Where institutions or agents acting on behalf of the president and therefore the state make laws and decisions that are unjust, illegal or morally repugnant in the application of “le devoir régalien du chef de d’état” noncompliance and no respect of these laws and regulations are seen as unpatriotic and unnationalistic. The argument is that the rule of law must be respected and redress must be sought within the rule of law even when that law is unjust or illegally applied, deliberately misinterpreted; selectively implemented and dynamically versatile to be moulded to suit situations and circumstances depending on affiliations and affinities. The burden for the respect of the rule of law therefore rests on those citizens as you move progressively away from the centre of power. The fluidity of actors dilutes the consistency of law especially as applied in the peripheries. This feeds a circle of exclusion and alienation rupturing the social contract between the state and the people. The destruction of the symbols of state such as burning of flags become expression of non compliance and non identification with the authority of the state feeding into the legalists’ narrative that disputed loyalty, lack total acceptance of government and non compliance with the status quo are unpatriotic and unnationalistic.

On the other hand reformists see patriotism and nationalism in terms of effective social justice, good governance, respect for the rule of law and good governance. Thus the fight against corruption, protecting the bicultural and bilingual state including calling for political reforms impacting on the form of the state are presented as acts of nationalism and patriotism.

The relationship between the “legalitarian” interpretation of patriotism and nationalism as applied by pro-government and majority French speaking Cameroonians is evident in the condescending and sometimes dismissive reactions to progressives and “transformists. From the 1950s and well into the 1970s, UPC activists were referred to as “les Marquis” or terrorists in modern parlance. Portrayed as enemies of the nation, Um Nyobe; Ernest Ouandie and the UPC leadership were decapitated (literally and figuratively) or forced into exile. The war against the enemies of the state, unpatriotic and unnationalistic UPC supporters resulted in the genocide of the Bassas and Bamilikes in a war that has never been acknowledged. History, however, has revealed that those who paraded the corridors of power and presented themselves as real patriots and nationalist were nothing short of “house slaves” and colonial collaborators. The role reversal has seen the traitors of yesterday exonerated and adored as the real nationalists and patriots

In the 1990s when a group of Anglophones questioned the relevance of the one party system and challenged the hegemony of the ruling party, they were referred to as “les ennemis dans la maison”.  Far reaching elements went further to refer to Anglophone Cameroonians as “les Biafriens” in reference to Ojuku’s breakaway republic in Nigeria; indirectly questioning both their rights to citizenship and their patriotism.

The educational system of a country forms an integral part its cultural heritage. It is the vehicle that links its past to its present and shapes the path for its future. The Anglophone subsystem of education and its GCE for generations has been the pride of the peoples of the Southern Cameroons; the GCE itself became an institution, a symbol of pride, of identity, valued and cherished by parents, students and teachers alike. The experiences of Anglophone students in the technical schools based on an adaption of the francophone system with the CAP, Probatoire and BAC tainted the perception that Anglophones had of the French system.  Not only were students taught in a strange form of English, examination questions sometimes loosely translate from French made no sense. Performance rates in these exams were almost always appalling.

At the start of this current crisis, Hubert Mono Djana, a francophone professor described Anglophone teachers and parents resisting the educational harmonisation plans proposed by the ministers of higher and secondary education as unpatriotic. The Anglophone subsystem of education forms a core of the bilingual and bicultural nature of the Cameroon state as founded in 1961. Touting the harmonisation agenda has been a recurrent theme by successive governments and rings the bells of a political agenda designed to transform the bicultural nature of the country into a replica French Cameroun state. The Teachers Association of Cameroon (TAC) and student protests of 1993, which led to the university uprisings and subsequent educational reforms (the creation of the GCE board and the University of Buea) were the direct consequences of attempts by Robert Mbella Mbappe then minister of national education to introduce the CAP, Probatoire and BAC in the English educational system. It was perceived by many then as an attempt to do away with the GCE and subvert the English sub system of education. It is, unsurprising therefore that there was a  global resistance to harmonisation, whatever the merits of it were. Merits which were poorly and condescendingly articulated; based on an ill-thought premise and a bizarre superiority complex that the French system of education is what is best for Cameroon. There appears to be an unrelenting perception that what is good for the goose must by necessity be best for the gander and the gosling. Yet the intricate historical and political evolution of the two Cameroons suggests that this by necessity is not always the case.

There appears to be an institutional and a systemic connivance with the vitriolic rhetoric regarding the patriotism of Southern Cameroonians. The unrestricted granting of media coverage by private and public TV and radio channels to some intellectuals, journalists and opinion leaders, whose xenophobic statements have bordered on declaring Anglophone and southern Cameroon protesters no Cameroonians seem to suggest this. For example Ernest Obama a journalist on Vision 4 television channel based in Yaoundé called for the eradication and the neutralisation of agitators by the forces of national security. His suggestions were widely perceived as hate speech and a call for genocide. While his diction incited a lot of protests including among Cameroon journalists who complained to the National Communications’ Council (NCC), Obama has remained active in the airwaves and was granted the privilege of interviewing the minister of communication and spokesperson for the government. Ernest Obama even asked the minister about the complaints made against him by English speaking journalist to the NCC and what the minister as chair of this regulatory outfit will do about it. On the other hand the minister of communication and chair of the NCC threatened to withdraw the licence/authorisation to broadcast of the television channel if they invited Anglophones to talk about that did not support the position of the state in the definition of national unity.

The virulent language has also resonated within administrative circles. The minister of justice and the minister of state in charge of communications variously described southern Cameroon protesters as terrorist and openly compared them to the armed Islamic group Boko Haram. This comparison has been repeated across various media by academics and journalists including Owona Nguini who described southern Cameroonian activists as “les apprentis sorcier”, “des analphabètes”, “ils sont fous ces autonomists”, “les aventuriers”, “si les illumines de l’ambazonisme tentent la voie armée ils seront massacre”. Thus it is not just the nationalism and patriotism of the Anglophones that is questioned by some French speaking academics and public figures but their intelligence and intellectual capacity to make judgement and independent reasoning. This lends credence to the argument, which has also been echoed by some Anglophones, that protesters back home are manipulated by the diaspora, who hidden in the comfort of their western societies feel safe behind their computer screens to incite others to protest and die on the streets.

Objectification and dehumanisation for decades have been employed as weapons in the pursuance of power and domination. Europeans justified slavery and slave ownership by describing Africans as less than humans and developing race theory to justify their perceived superiority. Objectification as a precursor to exploitation, violence and abuse is further visible particularly in studies relating to gender-based violence and the role of women in pornography. In studies of patriarchy, women are often described as objects to be owned by men and disposed of as the owners see fit. In the current context of southern Cameroons nationalism and politics, some Francophone academics have tended to objectify Southern Cameroonians rather than describe them a people and consequently valued citizens of the nation with integral rights of access to the public and political space.

Thus the recurrent theme of the southern Cameroonian being the enemy within necessitating the need for elimination, taming and controlling; two cubes of sugar that need to be absorbed thereby wiping out its uniqueness and identity; dogs that pose a threat to public peace and security needing to be put down.

The de-industrialisation of the southern Cameroons from 1961 illustrates the paternalistic and ownership approach in which francophone led government in Yaoundé disposed of southern Cameroons productive industries. Thus co-operations like the marketing board, Power Cam; banks, cooperatives, service sectors, public works department etc. were either shipped out of the region or facilitated to collapse. The treatment meted on protesters— particularly university students in Buea in October and November of 2016, the number of people killed between 22 September and 1 October 2017 and the mass incarcerations—demonstrates the less than human value attributed the citizens of the southern Cameroons by institutions and representatives of the state. The degrading treatment of having people bath and swim in sewage water and mud has been a continuing act of imposing the worse forms of humiliation. Humiliation is used to assert power through the denial and the destruction of status. Hence the arrest and incarceration of a sitting Supreme Court justice, a university professor, an international human rights lawyer and a popular radio talk show host. It is employed as a form of punishment, abuse and oppression, with the hope that the dread of humiliation will serve as a deterrent against political agitations, protests and uprising.

The very nature of humiliation is to undermine the victims resolve and ability against the aggressor. It targets the victim’s self-worth and self- esteem, inflicting significant emotional and psychological damage to eliminate the possibility of a fight back. The real cost of humiliation is the psychological and emotional damage it creates leaving behind a trail of post-traumatic stress. The purpose of the rampant degrading behaviour of the military and armed forces against the population is thus to impose a regime of fear, of anxiety and of permanent psychological damage that will prevent a resurgence of agitations and protests. Ultimately humiliation can be counterproductive when it bounces off on a wall of resilience and grit, especially when this has been ignored and underestimated.

Conclusion

The articulation of Southern Cameroons nationalism does not negate patriotism for a united Cameroon. There is no correlation between political party affiliation and nationalism. The Scottish National Party lost a referendum on Scottish independence yet won a majority in the UK general elections that followed. This supports the thesis that though the Scots are patriotic about Scotland their love for a Scottish identity does not negate their love for a united Great Britain. The Scottish Nationalist Party won an outright majority in the general elections in 2011 yet lost out on a Scottish independence referendum. Their love of the Scottish nation and the preservation of the Scottish culture and identity do not diminish their love and patriotism for a unified United Kingdom. Rather than perceive Southern Cameroons nationalism as a threat and unpatriotic manoeuvre, it should be embraced and celebrated, protected and recognised as being an integral to the nation building journey.

To argue that Cameroon is one or that Cameroon has always been one an indivisible is a deliberate misrepresentation of historical facts to drive a political agenda. The desire to maintain the unity of the Cameroon nation state should not be at the detriment of historical truth. Genuine nationalism should not be built on falsehood, deceit and coercion. The construction of a stable nation must emanate from the desires and aspirations of “home nations” to forge a single, united yet diversified national identity built on the mutual respect of individuality. The fight for social justice, for the rule of law, for better governance, for transparency for accountable must not be perceived as being at variance with nationalism. Rather corruption; greed; usurpation of political office, political gerrymandering, cronyism; nepotism must be seen as unpatriotic and anathema to nation building. To label those fighting for truth, Social justice, for good governance and for effective democratic processes and representation as unpatriotic in itself must be seen as acts of treason.

Citizenship and belonging: Who takes the prodigal child? (The Anglo-Bami and The 11th Province in a divided Cameroon: In search of a southern cameroons citizenship)

Citizenship and belonging: Who takes the prodigal child? (The Anglo-Bami and The 11^th Province in a divided Cameroon in search of a southern Cameroons citizenship)

As the debate rages on about the independence of the southern Cameroons, one group of people are left puzzled by what becomes of them. These are people in quest of an identity and a sense of belonging in a political debate that continues to polarize communities as well as divide families. For the most part, the Anglo-Bami have been struggled to assert allegiance in a political construct that thrives on promoting hate, division and pitting communities against each other.  Among the ruling francophone junta (the government ministers and CPDM big wigs) especially those from the “Pays Organisateur”, the Anglophones have always been “les enemis dans la maison”.  Where they have been deemed partners, their role has been to serve and promote the government’s agenda in bringing the Anglophone to toe the line of political expediency.

Today the question is being asked what happens to the Anglo-Bami and the 11^th Province when Southern Cameroons become independent. A lot of the debate in this quest for identity and belonging has included defining the terms Anglophone and francophone, identifying and defining who a southern Cameroonian is and how does someone become a citizen of an independent southern Cameroons. This is not a thesis on citizenship, neither is it a glossary on contextualising terms to suit their applicability within the Cameroon and southern Cameroons polities. Rather it is a personal reflection based on the realities of that I face and will face in an independent Southern Cameroons given my personal and family situation.
I am Anglo-Bami. My maternal grandmother hailed from Baminjindam and got married to a man from Akum.  I don’t know much about maternal grandfather and where he came from but I won’t be surprised if he had a Bami lineage. My paternal grandmother hailed from Babajou and got married to a man from Akum, born to a Bami father and a princess to the Akum Palace. My paternal grandfather, the son of a Bami man and the princess of Akum was to be given authority by the Babadjou chief to proclaim himself chief of Santa after the British and the French divided the Babadjou chiefdom at Matezem (present day tollgate in Santa) to create an international boundary that separated British southern Cameroons from French Cameroons. So if you know the Bomas you’d certainly know that by blood and by marriage we cannot distinguish ourselves from the Bamis. All my sisters but one is married to Bamis- Bafang, Bandekop, Babadjou, Bagante etc etc. My nieces and nephews are pure breed francophone: born, breed and educated francophone.
There is no universal definition of citizenship. However, in a much more liberal sense citizenship is conveys a sense of or a feeling of or a meaning of belonging and being included in the nation-state. It is the membership of nation state and this membership is dependent on a set of rights and duties forming a relational contract between the individual, peers and social institutions. There has been an erosion of people’s rights and the negation of its duties and responsibilities to the people by the state. Paradoxically the state has expected and has sought to command that citizens uphold their responsibilities to and perform their duties under the social institutions. This has contributed to the loss of the meaning of belonging, of that sense of identity, of acceptance within the Cameroon nation state.

As the southern Cameroons seeks to assert itself as a nation state there seems to be emerging an irony of fact or a paradox of history. The some Anglo-Bamis and people of the 11^th province are feeling alienated and are losing their sense of and the meaning of belonging all over again.

Within every nation state or country citizenship is attained through clearly defined pathways. Most often the primary route to citizenship is by birth. For some countires if you’re born in country or what constitutes that country’s territory (a plane, a ship in international waters etc) you automatically acquire that citizenship (principle of jus soli). Others grant citizenship by right of blood (principle of jus sanguinis), where automatically qualifies to take the citizenship of their parents irrespective of where they are born. Some countries also grant citizenship through meeting clearly defined qualifying residency requirements.

To be able to ease the worries, galvanize the movement, to be able to flesh the bones of the visionary state it is important that we start articulating what citizenship will look like in an independent southern Cameroons. For a new nation state, a country becoming independent and being able to exercise its sovereignty including deciding who its citizens are it will make a lot of sense for an independent southern Cameroons to apply jus soli and jus sanguinis in its elaboration of citizenship statutes/law and applying this retrospectively to cover those who can demonstrate birth rights or blood ties to qualifying parents at the time of independence. Therefore if you were born in the southern Cameroons or if your parents were born in the southern Cameroons, or qualify for citizenship by virtue of blood rights (jus sanguinis) you automatically qualify for citizenship at the time of independence.

If you’re unable to attain citizenship through jus soli and jus sanguinis then residency requirement should be applicable to determine your suitability for citizenship. This principle too should be applied retrospectively, meaning that if at the time of independence you can demonstrate that you have lived in the southern Cameroons for the required duration then you should be able to attain citizenship.

There should also be a transitional period for citizenship acquisition by affiliation. For example for people who do not meet jus soli, jus sanguinis or the residency requirement they may apply for and be granted citizenship if they have been married to someone (for a length of time equal to or surpassing the amount of time required to meet the residency requirement and) who qualifies for and takes up citizenship or whose children qualify for and take up citizenship.

Finally, considering that there is over half a century of shared history between the southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon it might be reasonable to set a transitional period for citizenship acquisition by application. What this means is that for people who do not qualify for citizenship by another means but will like to become citizens of the southern Cameroons, they may apply to commission for citizenship affairs, based clearly defined criteria for citizenship. They must demonstrate that they believe and uphold the ideals and values of the southern Cameroons state and where possible be willing to demonstrate that they are of upright moral standing. While the state may seek to promote inclusion it must also strive to protect its citizens.  

The main idea is to portray that the southern Cameroons state will not function on exclusion. Rather its principles should be guided by a desire to not repeat the ills of history experienced under the baton of French Cameroons, to fight marginalisation in all its forms while at the same time delivering social justice, development and highest services for its citizens.

 I must state that I believe in the historical rightness of the southern Cameroons struggle for independence. I believe in its legality. I believe it is not only justified but morally imperative and incumbent on us, as a people, as Cameroonians and as Southern Cameroonians, to assess within the prevailing context and for the sake of the social and economic development of the peoples of the two Cameroons, what will be in the greater good for the greater number of people. Mind you not everyone will benefit from a separation. Far from it! However, it is time to rise above self-interest and self-preservation to a point of self-sacrifice; it is time to inconvenient us to convenient future generations.

As an Anglo-Bami by birth and having children of my own caught up in the Anglo-Bami dilemma I don’t struggle with asserting myself as a Southern Cameroonian because I was born and breed a Southern Cameroonian. For you my fellow Anglo-Bamis and the people of the 11^th Province if you believe you’re a Southern Cameroonian don’t question your right to citizenship; claim it, assert it and exercise it. Don’t doubt where you belong because if you’re unable to define yourself others will define you. In 1961 Southern Cameroonians walked into already defined structures and institutions skewed to systematically disadvantage and exclude them. A new Southern Cameroons will be starting on a clean slate. It is therefore important that as an assertive citizen you make your voice heard in shaping the institutions of state designed to advantage the many and not the few.

 

Anglophone Teachers Are Unpatriotic: An Open Letter to Professor Hubert Mono Djana

Dear professor Hubert Mono Djana

Permit me to call you Hubert in this less formal communication. I know that in our Bantu culture I should call you papa Hubert, or grandpa or at least big brother. Age in our community, they say brings wisdom and is usually accompanied by the greying of hair. I have a few grey hairs myself but will not venture to think that we’re age mates though I may take the liberty to pretend to be wiser yet less academically endowed.

We live in an age where adults now behave like children and children are forced to take responsibility for prerogatives hitherto considered the purview of grown ups: teaching the truth for example or teaching children to be honest; to have values; to have integrity. I will not pretend to teach you truth, or integrity or how to be honest. Besides, what can an ordinary Anglophone teach a high and mighty professor?

 

Hubert, I understand you have written an article in Mutations news paper as reported by the Cameroon Journal, in which you describe Anglophone teachers as unpatriotic. It is also my understanding that these teachers oppose the machinations of your colleague and co-conspirator to annihilate Anglophone culture and abolish Anglo-Saxon higher education in Cameroon. And so you choose to question their patriotism.

Dear Hubert, on this question of patriotism, I understand from the Oxford English Dictionary, which is the trusted dictionary for us Anglophones that patriotism is having or experiencing devotion and vigorous support for one’s country. Some others have said patriotism is the love for one’s country and Hubert, you will agree with me that when you love someone, when you have a strong devotion to someone you will do everything in your power to protect them, to keep them away from harms way, to shield them from apprentice witches and wizards controlled like puppets by a master hidden in the shadows of a palace in Etoudi or Hotel Continental in Switzerland.

Hubert, you claimed that when Mr Biya, I will not call him president because he lost his legitimacy and therefore the right to be president when he stole the elections in 1992 and has rigged every election ever since to maintain himself in power; dropped the “United” from the name of the country to the republic of Cameroon, it was in a bid to foster national integration. I understand you probably suffer from the same amnesia or intellectual negligence that has contributed time again to see your friend appoint deceased persons to government and public offices. That decision had nothing to do with national integration. It was a continuation of the same scheme to systematically and institutional erode national integration and create a francophone hegemony in the Cameroons. It started with a violation of article 42 of the federal constitution to hold an illegal referendum in 1972 that changed the name of the country from a federal republic to a united republic.

Hubert, if you are honest to your children; if you want your children to know the true history of their country you will teach them that there are two countries in Cameroon: the Anglophone country and the francophone country. You will tell them that on 1^st January 1960, francophone Cameroon was known as the Republic of Cameroon. You will also tell them that on 1^st January 1960, Anglophone Cameroon was not part of the republic of Cameroon. You will teach your children that Anglophone Cameroon used to be a separate country called the Southern Cameroons. Hubert, if you are honest to your children you will teach them that when Anglophone Cameroon chose to join francophone Cameroon the two were to be known as the federal republic of Cameroon. Hubert, teach your children the true history of their country that they may avoid the same mistakes your peers have made.Tell them that when Mr Biya decided to revert to the name of the republic of Cameroon without asking the people of the Anglophone country what they wanted he was withdrawing the francophone country from the union; he was violating a sacred trust that brought the two countries together. If he wasn’t withdrawing the francophone country from the union then he was absorbing the Anglophone country into the francophone country. That is called invasion, annexation or colonisation. That is the truth. Teach your children the truth that they may have integrity and honesty. Alas! Nemo dat quod non habet...  

An Anglophone professor, one more deserving of the title who wrote the English version of the national anthem, whose contributions to national integration have over the years been systematically and institutional eroded from collective memory and national history books by  professors of your kind, less deserving and less worthy of the title; once wrote a book titled The Genuine Intellectual. If for some reason you’ve not read it I’ll recommend it to you. If you’ve read and have forgotten as it is quite common with professors of your kind who suffer from a kind of selective amnesia, who choose to distort history or who for reasons best known to you and them choose to be economical with the truth, I recommend you read it again. I will not remind you of its content; neither will I give you a lecture on being a genuine intellectual. Are you not the professor?

Hubert, you wonder which country Anglophone teachers are defending. Isn’t it obvious? They are defending their country-the Anglophone country, they are defending the common law, the Anglo-Saxon system of education. They are patriots fighting for the good of the country, putting the commonwealth before personal interest. They are being genuine intellectuals. Anglophone teachers a patriots speaking up for what they believe in, putting their hearts and livelihood on the line because they hold firm to the sacred truth that the fatherland comes first. They are not toeing a political line; they do not have a hidden agenda. As true patriots they believe in social justice, the have morals and hold dear the republican values of truth and integrity.

You see, the United Kingdom is made up of four countries: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Each has its educational policies and systems managed at local level by either national governments or local authorities. There has been no systemic drive to harmonise them. That still has not cancelled the fact that Scots have continued to call for the independence of Scotland. Those who have clamoured for Scottish independence have not been labelled unpatriotic. Rather they have been given the opportunity to access the political space and vote in a referendum, to engage the public in political debates. No! When it comes to Cameroon you and your kind will refer to Anglophone teachers as unpatriotic because you think that you have a monopoly of patriotism; that anyone who does not fit your lopsided narrative of political advancement is unpatriotic; that you own a monopoly of intellect.

Hubert, I agree with you that Cameroon is Cameroon. Cameroon is unique in its diversity. Cameroon is unique because it is only in Cameroon that we will have the same absentee president hold sway over a nation for 33 years. The uniqueness of Cameroon is evidently in the moral decrepitude of its leaders, of which you are a part of, dominated by people of the “pays organisateur”. Cameroon is unique because it is only in Cameroon that we have a new constitution at every election; where we will have toll gates without roads, where at 84 years of age we will have people holding onto their jobs in the public service yet retiring others at 55; where youths are 50 and where getting a job is always thanks to the president.

Hubert, I suppose you think Anglophones should be grateful to your country for its generosity in accepting them in 1961. Well, you are wrong. You think Anglophones are only complaining because they have discovered brown gold in their country. Well, you are wrong again. Before the 11 February 1961 plebiscites a good proportion of Anglophones wanted to be independent, brown gold or not. The rise of Anglophone nationalism today has nothing to do with new found oil, it has nothing to do with wealth, but all to do with patriotism, with a strong devotion to the fatherland. As a people Anglophones are proud of their historical, cultural and political heritage. They are not fighting to preserve the language of Shakespeare as you may have thought. They are fighting to preserve that which makes them uniquely Ambazonians or Cameroonians, which ever expression suits your whims.

I have often wondered myself why you and your colleagues are so fearful of the Anglophone way of life, of Anglophone consciousness. For some reason I have been led to believe that you see Anglophones in Cameroon as a social and political inconvenience, an obstacle in the way of consolidating a French and francophone hegemony in central Africa; the stain that has blotted your master’s record to perfect the “Francanization” of the central African region. You think that it is time to bring the anglofools to toe the line; to curtail their aspirations; to take away their name; strip away their laws, absorb their legal system; harmonise their educational system; take away their electrical supply; take away their seaport; wipe away their political institutions; create military basis. Soon you will harmonise the language; make French the only official language. Isn’t it already the de facto administrative language? Take away everything that makes them think of themselves as a people, as a country. Accuse them of being unpatriotic and make them feel guilty. Bully them! Bully them into submission.  

Your article is a simple confirmation of what some of you, the francophone elite think of us Anglophones. Yesterday it was “l’enemi dans la maison”. Today it is your turn to describe our teachers as unpatriotic. I hope our teachers don’t take offence with your utterances. Rather I hope Anglophones, especially the youths will learn from such declarations the spite with which you hold their educators and parents. I hope Anglophone politicians who ascribe to the fallacious notion of one and indivisible Cameroun see the contempt with which you treat their children’s teachers.

You see,   building a house that will stand the test of time requires a solid foundation. The foundation on which the present Cameroun is built, that is the Cameroun made up of the Anglophone and francophone countries is not solid. It is not solid because it is built on falsehood and illegality. There is no consensus on which to build a nation. There are a million cuts and bruises, open wounds and sores, some of them infected that no amount of plaster and bandages will prevent the pungent odour of their rottenness from rising to the surface. If you and your president want to build a nation, you should consider healing the wounds that you inflicted on nationalists like Felix Moumie; unravel the plasters that you’ve used to conceal the cuts you inflicted on Um Nyobe. Cleanse Ouandie’s name and reinstate him in his rightful place in history. Call them what they are: national heroes. And if your national integration drive will include the Anglophone country then you must right the wrongs of history. You must acknowledge the existence of the Anglophone state as a country in its own right, review the terms of the partnership, halt all plans to harmonise cum append it as an extension of the French empire in central Africa. You must accept the illegality of the 1972 referendum, you must let the Anglophone country recognise and celebrate October 1^st as its national day, recognise February 11 as a day of national unity so that it can take its historical significance, teach our children the correct history and bring back Ahmadou Ahidjo.

Hubert, I understand you and I may not agree on who to call a patriot you see; but that’s life and no matter our degree of disagreement I will not for once question your patriotism. I know you’re a patriot but of which country? Are you a patriot of France or a patriot of Cameroon?  However, if you asked my opinion who I think the true Cameroon  patriots are, I will say mothers and farmers in our villages who till and toil everyday to feed the nation; the buyam sellam ride the death traps called roads to ferry food from the villages to feed professors in the cities; I will say the nurses, midwives and doctors who strive everyday to operate patients in theatres with no running water or electricity; I will say the taxi driver and the “bendskineur” who ply our streets only to be robbed why hoodlums in uniforms; I will say the teachers in both private and public schools who struggle against all odds to teach our children a lesson or two in civic responsibility. I will think of girls and young mothers like those of the Associations of Aunties (RENATA) or Collette Bekaku of CAPEC, who are striving against all odds, as true heroes and patriots should, to protect and educate the Cameroonian child. I will ask you to learn a thing or two from these women about the true meaning of patriotism.

I will say a patriot is Felix Moumie, Ruben Um Nyobe, Ernest Ouandie, Lapiro de Mbanga, Bernard Fonlon, and Albert Mukong. I will not say Paul Biya, or Andre Mama Fouda who has 555 million francs cfa stashed in his home. I will not call you, or anyone else who is perpetrating this political hostage taking by a clique senile, grave dodging and corrupt chums, a patriot of the Cameroons because if you loved the Cameroons, if you were devoted to them you will protect them from greed and corruption, from lies and plundering.  

Dear Hubert, you’re the professor though and excuse my gullible youthful exuberance in thinking that I can question your authority on issues like patriotism. I am only 40 and still quite young by your standards and feeling rebellious at heart, believing that when I grow up I will be able to change things, make Cameroon right again. Maybe by the time I reach your age and not yet ready to retire I will know when to step aside and usher in my friends and school mates, those who will still be alive at 70 and 80 to sit in for me and do my bidding while a take a break by the sea in La Boule, or by a lake in Switzerland. Hopefully by then you’d be retired and playing songo’o and drinking palm wine in the village but if by then you find yourself in Kondengui I will send you a copy of Bernard Fonlon’s The Genuine Intellectual. It will make a good prison companion.  In the main time I hope you find a conscience that will keep you awake all night.