Since
November 2016, Cameroon
has found itself—not unexpectedly— in the middle of a political crisis. Some
academics, political commentators, journalists and politicians have preferred
to call this the Anglophone Crisis. In my opinion this is wrong. It started as
a strike action called for by Anglophone lawyers and teachers to force government
to address sectoral labour grievances, and limited to the Anglophone regions. Today,
however, it has metamorphosed into proportions that make it more of a
Cameroonian than exclusively Anglophone Crisis.
Even if
its immediate geographic theatre is the Anglophone regions, the present
situation poses an existential crisis for Cameroon as a whole. It has
revealed fundamental cracks going through to the foundations of the nation
itself. By sticking to the label “Anglophone crisis”, public and private
commentators— in particular those who sympathise with the regime— are seeking
to downplay the magnitude of the crisis by confining it’s geographic and,
arguably, psychological space. The objective here being to deflect and delay,
if possible social and political insurgence in other regions. This narrative
feeds into the social construction of the Anglophones as the “other” within
political discourse and therefore a group of people to be feared; to limit
sympathy and encourage apathy from the majority French speaking population of
the country. Far from being an “Anglophone crisis”, the current situation is a
Cameroonian or national crisis that touches on the legality and legitimacy of
the state; national unity and integration and, above all, the State’s authority
over 20% of the national territory. The crisis has also exposed fundamental
questions about the understanding and application of the concepts of
nationalism, citizenship and belonging, identity, community cohesion and
cohabitation in the Cameroonian context.
These concepts, if poorly articulated (as has often been the case) can profoundly
impact social cohesion, peace and security.
In various
social forums, especially among much francophone online community, there seem
to be a misconception about the constitution and composition of the present Cameroon nation
state. By design or deceit, many tend to believe that a single Cameroonian
nation pre-dated German colonisation in 1884. This belief contravenes all
historical evidence. Before the establishment of the German colony or
protectorate the territory geographically defined thereafter as Kamerun, was a mosaic of ethnic groups
governed as kingdoms or chiefdoms. These kingdoms and chiefdoms were either
completely independent of each other or sometimes confederated.
Rio dos Cameroes, as named by the Portuguese
was a reference to the estuaries and the areas surrounding the River Wouri. The
German Kamerun extended beyond the frontiers of present day Cameroon and included northern parts of Gabon
and the Congo with western
parts of the Central African Republic,
southwestern parts of Chad
and far eastern parts of Nigeria.
Germany’s defeat during
world war one (WW1) by allied forces saw the re-balkanization of German
protectorates particularly between France
and Britain.
As a result, parts of German Kamerun were merged with neighboring French
colonies of Gabon, Central Africa and to an extent British Nigeria. What was
left of German Kamerun was subsequently divided into two parts: the French
Cameroons and the British Cameroons. The
British Cameroons was further divided into British Southern Cameroons and
British Northern Cameroons. While the British
Northern Cameroons opted to join Nigeria British Southern Cameroons
voted in a UN sponsored plebiscite on 11th February 1961 to join
French Cameroon. A number of preliminary conclusions arise from this.
The first is that present day Cameroon is only a fraction of what
existed topographically as German Kamerun. Second, present day Cameroon did
not exist before October 1, 1961. This is the date when the decision—independence and reunification— taken by
British Southern Cameroon eight months earlier in the plebiscite took effect
with Britain’s final withdrawal. Third, and odd as it may sound, British
Southern Cameroon was technically and legally an independent territory at the
same moment as it was joining French Cameroon, which had gained its
independence from France earlier
on January 1, 1960. At its founding therefore on October 1 1961, present day
Cameroon was not one but two distinct territories which through the popular
will of the people of the former British Southern Cameroons and the political
will of the leaders of the French Cameroons came together to form a new state,
the federal republic of Cameroon. The 1961 Federal Republic
was not German Kamerun. It was not the same territory conquered by Allied
forces in 1914/15. It was not all of the mandated territories of the League of
Nations and it was not all of the trust territories of the United Nation
entrusted to Britain and France.
While
it is possible to discuss the current crisis as a separate and distinct episode
in Cameroon’s social and political history, it is however impossible to analyse
how the application of the concept of nationalism, patriotism and citizenship
and belonging have evolved in Cameroon without referring to the very
foundations of the Cameroon nation and the concept of “Cameroonism”. The current
crisis calls to question what it means to be Cameroonian. “Cameroonism” refers
to the ideology of being Cameroonian, the development of values that a peculiar
and uniquely Cameroonian and the codification of a Cameroonian identity that provides
the framework for assessing Cameroonian patriotism, nationalism and the Cameroonian
way of life.
As the debate rages on about
the status of the Southern Cameroons within
the present nation state legitimate questions have emerged about the concepts
of patriotism and nationalism as understood by citizens on both sides of the
political debate. On the one hand the
“legalists”, predominantly pro government Anglophones and some French speaking
Cameroonians have described patriotism and nationalism in terms of undisputed
loyalty to “les institutions républicaines”, a
total acceptance of government and an unquestioning compliance with the status
quo. They see reformist, whether progressives or “transformist” as unpatriotic
and unnationalistic agitators. They portray the president as incarnating the
nation therefore being the nation. A dislike for the president is therefore a
dislike for the nation. The president wields the power of the nation.
Government and republican institutions wield the power of the president and
therefore non-respect of these institutions and government is non-respect for
the president and therefore unpatriotic and unnationalistic. Where institutions
or agents acting on behalf of the president and therefore the state make laws
and decisions that are unjust, illegal or morally repugnant in the application
of “le devoir régalien du
chef de d’état” noncompliance and no respect of these laws and regulations are
seen as unpatriotic and unnationalistic. The argument is that the rule of law
must be respected and redress must be sought within the rule of law even when
that law is unjust or illegally applied, deliberately misinterpreted;
selectively implemented and dynamically versatile to be moulded to suit
situations and circumstances depending on affiliations and affinities. The
burden for the respect of the rule of law therefore rests on those citizens as
you move progressively away from the centre of power. The fluidity of actors
dilutes the consistency of law especially as applied in the peripheries. This feeds
a circle of exclusion and alienation rupturing the social contract between the
state and the people. The destruction of the symbols of state such as burning
of flags become expression of non compliance and non identification with the
authority of the state feeding into the legalists’ narrative that disputed
loyalty, lack total acceptance of government and non compliance with the status
quo are unpatriotic and unnationalistic.
On the other hand reformists
see patriotism and nationalism in terms of effective social justice, good governance,
respect for the rule of law and good governance. Thus the fight against
corruption, protecting the bicultural and bilingual state including calling for
political reforms impacting on the form of the state are presented as acts of
nationalism and patriotism.
The
relationship between the “legalitarian” interpretation of patriotism and
nationalism as applied by pro-government and majority French speaking
Cameroonians is evident in the condescending and sometimes dismissive reactions
to progressives and “transformists. From the 1950s and well into the 1970s, UPC
activists were referred to as “les Marquis” or terrorists in modern parlance.
Portrayed as enemies of the nation, Um Nyobe; Ernest Ouandie and the UPC
leadership were decapitated (literally and figuratively) or forced into exile.
The war against the enemies of the state, unpatriotic and unnationalistic UPC
supporters resulted in the genocide of the Bassas and Bamilikes in a war that
has never been acknowledged. History, however, has revealed that those who
paraded the corridors of power and presented themselves as real patriots and
nationalist were nothing short of “house slaves” and colonial collaborators.
The role reversal has seen the traitors of yesterday exonerated and adored as
the real nationalists and patriots
In the 1990s
when a group of Anglophones questioned the relevance of the one party system
and challenged the hegemony of the ruling party, they were referred to as “les ennemis
dans la maison”. Far reaching elements
went further to refer to Anglophone Cameroonians as “les Biafriens” in
reference to Ojuku’s breakaway republic in Nigeria; indirectly questioning
both their rights to citizenship and their patriotism.
The
educational system of a country forms an integral part its cultural heritage.
It is the vehicle that links its past to its present and shapes the path for
its future. The Anglophone subsystem of education and its GCE for generations
has been the pride of the peoples of the Southern
Cameroons; the GCE itself became an institution, a symbol of
pride, of identity, valued and cherished by parents, students and teachers
alike. The experiences of Anglophone students in the technical schools based on
an adaption of the francophone system with the CAP, Probatoire and BAC tainted
the perception that Anglophones had of the French system. Not only were students taught in a strange
form of English, examination questions sometimes loosely translate from French
made no sense. Performance rates in these exams were almost always appalling.
At the
start of this current crisis, Hubert Mono Djana, a francophone professor described
Anglophone teachers and parents resisting the educational harmonisation plans
proposed by the ministers of higher and secondary education as unpatriotic. The
Anglophone subsystem of education forms a core of the bilingual and bicultural
nature of the Cameroon
state as founded in 1961. Touting the harmonisation agenda has been a recurrent
theme by successive governments and rings the bells of a political agenda
designed to transform the bicultural nature of the country into a replica French
Cameroun state. The Teachers Association of Cameroon (TAC) and student protests
of 1993, which led to the university uprisings and subsequent educational
reforms (the creation of the GCE board and the University of Buea)
were the direct consequences of attempts by Robert Mbella Mbappe then minister
of national education to introduce the CAP, Probatoire and BAC in the English
educational system. It was perceived by many then as an attempt to do away with
the GCE and subvert the English sub system of education. It is, unsurprising
therefore that there was a global
resistance to harmonisation, whatever the merits of it were. Merits which were
poorly and condescendingly articulated; based on an ill-thought premise and a
bizarre superiority complex that the French system of education is what is best
for Cameroon. There appears to be an unrelenting perception that what is good
for the goose must by necessity be best for the gander and the gosling. Yet the
intricate historical and political evolution of the two Cameroons
suggests that this by necessity is not always the case.
There
appears to be an institutional and a systemic connivance with the vitriolic
rhetoric regarding the patriotism of Southern Cameroonians.
The unrestricted granting of media coverage by private and public TV and radio
channels to some intellectuals, journalists and opinion leaders, whose
xenophobic statements have bordered on declaring Anglophone and southern
Cameroon protesters no Cameroonians seem to suggest this. For example Ernest
Obama a journalist on Vision 4 television channel based in Yaoundé called for
the eradication and the neutralisation of agitators by the forces of national
security. His suggestions were widely perceived as hate speech and a call for
genocide. While his diction incited a lot of protests including among Cameroon
journalists who complained to the National Communications’ Council (NCC), Obama
has remained active in the airwaves and was granted the privilege of
interviewing the minister of communication and spokesperson for the government.
Ernest Obama even asked the minister about the complaints made against him by
English speaking journalist to the NCC and what the minister as chair of this
regulatory outfit will do about it. On the other hand the minister of communication
and chair of the NCC threatened to withdraw the licence/authorisation to broadcast
of the television channel if they invited Anglophones to talk about that did
not support the position of the state in the definition of national unity.
The
virulent language has also resonated within administrative circles. The
minister of justice and the minister of state in charge of communications
variously described southern Cameroon
protesters as terrorist and openly compared them to the armed Islamic group
Boko Haram. This comparison has been repeated across various media by academics
and journalists including Owona Nguini who described southern Cameroonian
activists as “les apprentis sorcier”, “des analphabètes”, “ils sont fous ces
autonomists”, “les aventuriers”, “si les illumines de l’ambazonisme tentent la voie
armée ils seront massacre”. Thus it is not just the nationalism and patriotism
of the Anglophones that is questioned by some French speaking academics and
public figures but their intelligence and intellectual capacity to make
judgement and independent reasoning. This lends credence to the argument, which
has also been echoed by some Anglophones, that protesters back home are
manipulated by the diaspora, who hidden in the comfort of their western
societies feel safe behind their computer screens to incite others to protest
and die on the streets.
Objectification
and dehumanisation for decades have been employed as weapons in the pursuance
of power and domination. Europeans justified slavery and slave ownership by
describing Africans as less than humans and developing race theory to justify
their perceived superiority. Objectification as a precursor to exploitation,
violence and abuse is further visible particularly in studies relating to
gender-based violence and the role of women in pornography. In studies of
patriarchy, women are often described as objects to be owned by men and disposed
of as the owners see fit. In the current context of southern Cameroons
nationalism and politics, some Francophone academics have tended to objectify Southern Cameroonians rather than describe them a people
and consequently valued citizens of the nation with integral rights of access
to the public and political space.
Thus
the recurrent theme of the southern Cameroonian being the enemy within
necessitating the need for elimination, taming and controlling; two cubes of
sugar that need to be absorbed thereby wiping out its uniqueness and identity;
dogs that pose a threat to public peace and security needing to be put down.
The
de-industrialisation of the southern Cameroons from 1961 illustrates the
paternalistic and ownership approach in which francophone led government in
Yaoundé disposed of southern Cameroons
productive industries. Thus co-operations like the marketing board, Power Cam;
banks, cooperatives, service sectors, public works department etc. were either
shipped out of the region or facilitated to collapse. The treatment meted on
protesters— particularly university students in Buea in October and November of
2016, the number of people killed between 22 September and 1 October 2017 and
the mass incarcerations—demonstrates the less than human value attributed the
citizens of the southern Cameroons by
institutions and representatives of the state. The degrading treatment of
having people bath and swim in sewage water and mud has been a continuing act
of imposing the worse forms of humiliation. Humiliation is used to assert power
through the denial and the destruction of status. Hence the arrest and
incarceration of a sitting Supreme Court justice, a university professor, an
international human rights lawyer and a popular radio talk show host. It is
employed as a form of punishment, abuse and oppression, with the hope that the
dread of humiliation will serve as a deterrent against political agitations,
protests and uprising.
The
very nature of humiliation is to undermine the victims resolve and ability
against the aggressor. It targets the victim’s self-worth and self- esteem,
inflicting significant emotional and psychological damage to eliminate the
possibility of a fight back. The real cost of humiliation is the psychological
and emotional damage it creates leaving behind a trail of post-traumatic
stress. The purpose of the rampant degrading behaviour of the military and
armed forces against the population is thus to impose a regime of fear, of
anxiety and of permanent psychological damage that will prevent a resurgence of
agitations and protests. Ultimately humiliation can be counterproductive when
it bounces off on a wall of resilience and grit, especially when this has been
ignored and underestimated.
Conclusion
The
articulation of Southern Cameroons nationalism does not negate patriotism for a
united Cameroon.
There is no correlation between political party affiliation and nationalism.
The Scottish National Party lost a referendum on Scottish independence yet won
a majority in the UK
general elections that followed. This supports the thesis that though the Scots
are patriotic about Scotland
their love for a Scottish identity does not negate their love for a united Great Britain. The
Scottish Nationalist Party won an outright majority in the general elections in
2011 yet lost out on a Scottish independence referendum. Their love of the
Scottish nation and the preservation of the Scottish culture and identity do
not diminish their love and patriotism for a unified United Kingdom. Rather than
perceive Southern Cameroons nationalism as a
threat and unpatriotic manoeuvre, it should be embraced and celebrated,
protected and recognised as being an integral to the nation building journey.
To
argue that Cameroon is one
or that Cameroon
has always been one an indivisible is a deliberate misrepresentation of
historical facts to drive a political agenda. The desire to maintain the unity
of the Cameroon
nation state should not be at the detriment of historical truth. Genuine
nationalism should not be built on falsehood, deceit and coercion. The
construction of a stable nation must emanate from the desires and aspirations
of “home nations” to forge a single, united yet diversified national identity
built on the mutual respect of individuality. The fight for social justice, for
the rule of law, for better governance, for transparency for accountable must
not be perceived as being at variance with nationalism. Rather corruption;
greed; usurpation of political office, political gerrymandering, cronyism;
nepotism must be seen as unpatriotic and anathema to nation building. To label
those fighting for truth, Social justice, for good governance
and for effective democratic processes and representation as unpatriotic in
itself must be seen as acts of treason.
