Monday 30 October 2017

Reassessing Anglophone patriotism and nationalism in the context of the Southern Cameroons question within a united Cameroon


Since November 2016, Cameroon has found itself—not unexpectedly— in the middle of a political crisis. Some academics, political commentators, journalists and politicians have preferred to call this the Anglophone Crisis. In my opinion this is wrong. It started as a strike action called for by Anglophone lawyers and teachers to force government to address sectoral labour grievances, and limited to the Anglophone regions. Today, however, it has metamorphosed into proportions that make it more of a Cameroonian than exclusively Anglophone Crisis.

Even if its immediate geographic theatre is the Anglophone regions, the present situation poses an existential crisis for Cameroon as a whole. It has revealed fundamental cracks going through to the foundations of the nation itself. By sticking to the label “Anglophone crisis”, public and private commentators— in particular those who sympathise with the regime— are seeking to downplay the magnitude of the crisis by confining it’s geographic and, arguably, psychological space. The objective here being to deflect and delay, if possible social and political insurgence in other regions. This narrative feeds into the social construction of the Anglophones as the “other” within political discourse and therefore a group of people to be feared; to limit sympathy and encourage apathy from the majority French speaking population of the country. Far from being an “Anglophone crisis”, the current situation is a Cameroonian or national crisis that touches on the legality and legitimacy of the state; national unity and integration and, above all, the State’s authority over 20% of the national territory. The crisis has also exposed fundamental questions about the understanding and application of the concepts of nationalism, citizenship and belonging, identity, community cohesion and cohabitation in the Cameroonian context.  These concepts, if poorly articulated (as has often been the case) can profoundly impact social cohesion, peace and security.

In various social forums, especially among much francophone online community, there seem to be a misconception about the constitution and composition of the present Cameroon nation state. By design or deceit, many tend to believe that a single Cameroonian nation pre-dated German colonisation in 1884. This belief contravenes all historical evidence. Before the establishment of the German colony or protectorate the territory geographically defined thereafter as Kamerun, was a mosaic of ethnic groups governed as kingdoms or chiefdoms. These kingdoms and chiefdoms were either completely independent of each other or sometimes confederated.

Rio dos Cameroes, as named by the Portuguese was a reference to the estuaries and the areas surrounding the River Wouri. The German Kamerun extended beyond the frontiers of present day Cameroon and included northern parts of Gabon and the Congo with western parts of the Central African Republic, southwestern parts of Chad and far eastern parts of Nigeria. Germany’s defeat during world war one (WW1) by allied forces saw the re-balkanization of German protectorates particularly between France and Britain. As a result, parts of German Kamerun were merged with neighboring French colonies of Gabon, Central Africa and to an extent British Nigeria. What was left of German Kamerun was subsequently divided into two parts: the French Cameroons and the British Cameroons. The British Cameroons was further divided into British Southern Cameroons and British Northern Cameroons. While the British Northern Cameroons opted to join Nigeria British Southern Cameroons voted in a UN sponsored plebiscite on 11th February 1961 to join French Cameroon. A number of preliminary conclusions arise from this.

The first is that present day Cameroon is only a fraction of what existed topographically as German Kamerun. Second, present day Cameroon did not exist before October 1, 1961. This is the date when the decision—independence and reunification— taken by British Southern Cameroon eight months earlier in the plebiscite took effect with Britain’s final withdrawal. Third, and odd as it may sound, British Southern Cameroon was technically and legally an independent territory at the same moment as it was joining French Cameroon, which had gained its independence  from France earlier on January 1, 1960. At its founding therefore on October 1 1961, present day Cameroon was not one but two distinct territories which through the popular will of the people of the former British Southern Cameroons and the political will of the leaders of the French Cameroons came together to form a new state, the federal republic of Cameroon. The 1961 Federal Republic was not German Kamerun. It was not the same territory conquered by Allied forces in 1914/15. It was not all of the mandated territories of the League of Nations and it was not all of the trust territories of the United Nation entrusted to Britain and France.

While it is possible to discuss the current crisis as a separate and distinct episode in Cameroon’s social and political history, it is however impossible to analyse how the application of the concept of nationalism, patriotism and citizenship and belonging have evolved in Cameroon without referring to the very foundations of the Cameroon nation and the concept of “Cameroonism”. The current crisis calls to question what it means to be Cameroonian. “Cameroonism” refers to the ideology of being Cameroonian, the development of values that a peculiar and uniquely Cameroonian and the codification of a Cameroonian identity that provides the framework for assessing Cameroonian patriotism, nationalism and the Cameroonian way of life.

As the debate rages on about the status of the Southern Cameroons within the present nation state legitimate questions have emerged about the concepts of patriotism and nationalism as understood by citizens on both sides of the political debate.  On the one hand the “legalists”, predominantly pro government Anglophones and some French speaking Cameroonians have described patriotism and nationalism in terms of undisputed loyalty to “les institutions républicaines”, a total acceptance of government and an unquestioning compliance with the status quo. They see reformist, whether progressives or “transformist” as unpatriotic and unnationalistic agitators. They portray the president as incarnating the nation therefore being the nation. A dislike for the president is therefore a dislike for the nation. The president wields the power of the nation. Government and republican institutions wield the power of the president and therefore non-respect of these institutions and government is non-respect for the president and therefore unpatriotic and unnationalistic. Where institutions or agents acting on behalf of the president and therefore the state make laws and decisions that are unjust, illegal or morally repugnant in the application of “le devoir régalien du chef de d’état” noncompliance and no respect of these laws and regulations are seen as unpatriotic and unnationalistic. The argument is that the rule of law must be respected and redress must be sought within the rule of law even when that law is unjust or illegally applied, deliberately misinterpreted; selectively implemented and dynamically versatile to be moulded to suit situations and circumstances depending on affiliations and affinities. The burden for the respect of the rule of law therefore rests on those citizens as you move progressively away from the centre of power. The fluidity of actors dilutes the consistency of law especially as applied in the peripheries. This feeds a circle of exclusion and alienation rupturing the social contract between the state and the people. The destruction of the symbols of state such as burning of flags become expression of non compliance and non identification with the authority of the state feeding into the legalists’ narrative that disputed loyalty, lack total acceptance of government and non compliance with the status quo are unpatriotic and unnationalistic.

On the other hand reformists see patriotism and nationalism in terms of effective social justice, good governance, respect for the rule of law and good governance. Thus the fight against corruption, protecting the bicultural and bilingual state including calling for political reforms impacting on the form of the state are presented as acts of nationalism and patriotism.

The relationship between the “legalitarian” interpretation of patriotism and nationalism as applied by pro-government and majority French speaking Cameroonians is evident in the condescending and sometimes dismissive reactions to progressives and “transformists. From the 1950s and well into the 1970s, UPC activists were referred to as “les Marquis” or terrorists in modern parlance. Portrayed as enemies of the nation, Um Nyobe; Ernest Ouandie and the UPC leadership were decapitated (literally and figuratively) or forced into exile. The war against the enemies of the state, unpatriotic and unnationalistic UPC supporters resulted in the genocide of the Bassas and Bamilikes in a war that has never been acknowledged. History, however, has revealed that those who paraded the corridors of power and presented themselves as real patriots and nationalist were nothing short of “house slaves” and colonial collaborators. The role reversal has seen the traitors of yesterday exonerated and adored as the real nationalists and patriots

In the 1990s when a group of Anglophones questioned the relevance of the one party system and challenged the hegemony of the ruling party, they were referred to as “les ennemis dans la maison”.  Far reaching elements went further to refer to Anglophone Cameroonians as “les Biafriens” in reference to Ojuku’s breakaway republic in Nigeria; indirectly questioning both their rights to citizenship and their patriotism.

The educational system of a country forms an integral part its cultural heritage. It is the vehicle that links its past to its present and shapes the path for its future. The Anglophone subsystem of education and its GCE for generations has been the pride of the peoples of the Southern Cameroons; the GCE itself became an institution, a symbol of pride, of identity, valued and cherished by parents, students and teachers alike. The experiences of Anglophone students in the technical schools based on an adaption of the francophone system with the CAP, Probatoire and BAC tainted the perception that Anglophones had of the French system.  Not only were students taught in a strange form of English, examination questions sometimes loosely translate from French made no sense. Performance rates in these exams were almost always appalling.

At the start of this current crisis, Hubert Mono Djana, a francophone professor described Anglophone teachers and parents resisting the educational harmonisation plans proposed by the ministers of higher and secondary education as unpatriotic. The Anglophone subsystem of education forms a core of the bilingual and bicultural nature of the Cameroon state as founded in 1961. Touting the harmonisation agenda has been a recurrent theme by successive governments and rings the bells of a political agenda designed to transform the bicultural nature of the country into a replica French Cameroun state. The Teachers Association of Cameroon (TAC) and student protests of 1993, which led to the university uprisings and subsequent educational reforms (the creation of the GCE board and the University of Buea) were the direct consequences of attempts by Robert Mbella Mbappe then minister of national education to introduce the CAP, Probatoire and BAC in the English educational system. It was perceived by many then as an attempt to do away with the GCE and subvert the English sub system of education. It is, unsurprising therefore that there was a  global resistance to harmonisation, whatever the merits of it were. Merits which were poorly and condescendingly articulated; based on an ill-thought premise and a bizarre superiority complex that the French system of education is what is best for Cameroon. There appears to be an unrelenting perception that what is good for the goose must by necessity be best for the gander and the gosling. Yet the intricate historical and political evolution of the two Cameroons suggests that this by necessity is not always the case.

There appears to be an institutional and a systemic connivance with the vitriolic rhetoric regarding the patriotism of Southern Cameroonians. The unrestricted granting of media coverage by private and public TV and radio channels to some intellectuals, journalists and opinion leaders, whose xenophobic statements have bordered on declaring Anglophone and southern Cameroon protesters no Cameroonians seem to suggest this. For example Ernest Obama a journalist on Vision 4 television channel based in Yaoundé called for the eradication and the neutralisation of agitators by the forces of national security. His suggestions were widely perceived as hate speech and a call for genocide. While his diction incited a lot of protests including among Cameroon journalists who complained to the National Communications’ Council (NCC), Obama has remained active in the airwaves and was granted the privilege of interviewing the minister of communication and spokesperson for the government. Ernest Obama even asked the minister about the complaints made against him by English speaking journalist to the NCC and what the minister as chair of this regulatory outfit will do about it. On the other hand the minister of communication and chair of the NCC threatened to withdraw the licence/authorisation to broadcast of the television channel if they invited Anglophones to talk about that did not support the position of the state in the definition of national unity.

The virulent language has also resonated within administrative circles. The minister of justice and the minister of state in charge of communications variously described southern Cameroon protesters as terrorist and openly compared them to the armed Islamic group Boko Haram. This comparison has been repeated across various media by academics and journalists including Owona Nguini who described southern Cameroonian activists as “les apprentis sorcier”, “des analphabètes”, “ils sont fous ces autonomists”, “les aventuriers”, “si les illumines de l’ambazonisme tentent la voie armée ils seront massacre”. Thus it is not just the nationalism and patriotism of the Anglophones that is questioned by some French speaking academics and public figures but their intelligence and intellectual capacity to make judgement and independent reasoning. This lends credence to the argument, which has also been echoed by some Anglophones, that protesters back home are manipulated by the diaspora, who hidden in the comfort of their western societies feel safe behind their computer screens to incite others to protest and die on the streets.

Objectification and dehumanisation for decades have been employed as weapons in the pursuance of power and domination. Europeans justified slavery and slave ownership by describing Africans as less than humans and developing race theory to justify their perceived superiority. Objectification as a precursor to exploitation, violence and abuse is further visible particularly in studies relating to gender-based violence and the role of women in pornography. In studies of patriarchy, women are often described as objects to be owned by men and disposed of as the owners see fit. In the current context of southern Cameroons nationalism and politics, some Francophone academics have tended to objectify Southern Cameroonians rather than describe them a people and consequently valued citizens of the nation with integral rights of access to the public and political space.

Thus the recurrent theme of the southern Cameroonian being the enemy within necessitating the need for elimination, taming and controlling; two cubes of sugar that need to be absorbed thereby wiping out its uniqueness and identity; dogs that pose a threat to public peace and security needing to be put down.

The de-industrialisation of the southern Cameroons from 1961 illustrates the paternalistic and ownership approach in which francophone led government in Yaoundé disposed of southern Cameroons productive industries. Thus co-operations like the marketing board, Power Cam; banks, cooperatives, service sectors, public works department etc. were either shipped out of the region or facilitated to collapse. The treatment meted on protesters— particularly university students in Buea in October and November of 2016, the number of people killed between 22 September and 1 October 2017 and the mass incarcerations—demonstrates the less than human value attributed the citizens of the southern Cameroons by institutions and representatives of the state. The degrading treatment of having people bath and swim in sewage water and mud has been a continuing act of imposing the worse forms of humiliation. Humiliation is used to assert power through the denial and the destruction of status. Hence the arrest and incarceration of a sitting Supreme Court justice, a university professor, an international human rights lawyer and a popular radio talk show host. It is employed as a form of punishment, abuse and oppression, with the hope that the dread of humiliation will serve as a deterrent against political agitations, protests and uprising.

The very nature of humiliation is to undermine the victims resolve and ability against the aggressor. It targets the victim’s self-worth and self- esteem, inflicting significant emotional and psychological damage to eliminate the possibility of a fight back. The real cost of humiliation is the psychological and emotional damage it creates leaving behind a trail of post-traumatic stress. The purpose of the rampant degrading behaviour of the military and armed forces against the population is thus to impose a regime of fear, of anxiety and of permanent psychological damage that will prevent a resurgence of agitations and protests. Ultimately humiliation can be counterproductive when it bounces off on a wall of resilience and grit, especially when this has been ignored and underestimated.

Conclusion

The articulation of Southern Cameroons nationalism does not negate patriotism for a united Cameroon. There is no correlation between political party affiliation and nationalism. The Scottish National Party lost a referendum on Scottish independence yet won a majority in the UK general elections that followed. This supports the thesis that though the Scots are patriotic about Scotland their love for a Scottish identity does not negate their love for a united Great Britain. The Scottish Nationalist Party won an outright majority in the general elections in 2011 yet lost out on a Scottish independence referendum. Their love of the Scottish nation and the preservation of the Scottish culture and identity do not diminish their love and patriotism for a unified United Kingdom. Rather than perceive Southern Cameroons nationalism as a threat and unpatriotic manoeuvre, it should be embraced and celebrated, protected and recognised as being an integral to the nation building journey.

To argue that Cameroon is one or that Cameroon has always been one an indivisible is a deliberate misrepresentation of historical facts to drive a political agenda. The desire to maintain the unity of the Cameroon nation state should not be at the detriment of historical truth. Genuine nationalism should not be built on falsehood, deceit and coercion. The construction of a stable nation must emanate from the desires and aspirations of “home nations” to forge a single, united yet diversified national identity built on the mutual respect of individuality. The fight for social justice, for the rule of law, for better governance, for transparency for accountable must not be perceived as being at variance with nationalism. Rather corruption; greed; usurpation of political office, political gerrymandering, cronyism; nepotism must be seen as unpatriotic and anathema to nation building. To label those fighting for truth, Social justice, for good governance and for effective democratic processes and representation as unpatriotic in itself must be seen as acts of treason.